Aoû 31, 2014
Post racial Amerikkka
I’m so disgusted.
white people are ghouls
Aoû 31, 2014
I should note that my fairly staunch anti positivist positions are based around what I see as a faulty epistemological expectation imposed onto the humanities and social sciences, not a rejection of positivist techniques and perspectives on the whole. In certain fields of study, positivist techniques are crucial and that should be respected.
(via thenewwomensmovement)Aoû 31, 2014
It seems that the role of dynamite is to violently blast open, within a given practice, a kind of vacuum, which is considered to be the only possible site of the event. This vacuum is the privileged pace from which it becomes possible to create, as well as to see or perceive what has been crated. […] If Nietzsche considers himself to be dynamite, he does not identify this dynamite with some kind of “big bang.” In reading Nietzsche, we must never lose sight of this irreducible obverse of his bombastic expressions (silence, solitude, playfulness, lightness, nuance, minimal difference). Yet, as I suggested before, the silence is not something that takes place before or after the explosion—it is the silence at the very heard of the “explosion,” the stillness of the event. Conversely, we must also not lose sight of the fact that the complementary and correlative inversion of Nietzsche’s praise of nuances, of dance, of perspectivity, of fictions, of the layering of appearances and differences, is precisely the “bomb” of the event. This emphasis is especially important, since Nietzsche is often regarded as post-modernist avant la lettre, the first to have announced the end of “grand narratives,” and paved the way for a multitude of different fictions and virtualities to be considered as of being of equal value. In other words, it is worth emphasizing that, for Nietzsche, the “nuance” is nothing other than the expression or, more precisely, the articulation of a grand narrative, of an event.Alenka Zupančič, "The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two" (via aidsnegligee) Aoû 31, 2014
Aoû 31, 2014
1. Art is not the sublime descent of the infinite into the finite abjection of the body and sexuality. It is the production of an infinite subjective series through the finite means of a material subtraction.
2. Art cannot merely be the expression of a particularity (be it ethnic or personal). Art is the impersonal production of a truth that is addressed to everyone.
3. Art is the process of a truth, and this truth is always the truth of the sensible or sensual, the sensible as sensible. This means : the transformation of the sensible into a happening of the Idea.
4. There is necessarily a plurality of arts, and however we may imagine the ways in which the arts might intersect there is no imaginable way of totalizing this plurality.
5. Every art develops from an impure form, and the progressive purification of this impurity shapes the history both of a particular artistic truth and of its exhaustion.
6. The subject of an artistic truth is the set of the works which compose it.
7. This composition is an infinite configuration, which, in our own contemporary artistic context, is a generic totality.
8. The real of art is ideal impurity conceived through the immanent process of its purification. In other words, the raw material of art is determined by the contingent inception of a form. Art is the secondary formalization of the advent of a hitherto formless form.
9. The only maxim of contemporary art is not to be imperial. This also means: it does not have to be democratic, if democracy implies conformity with the imperial idea of political liberty.
10. Non-imperial art is necessarily abstract art, in this sense : it abstracts itself from all particularity, and formalizes this gesture of abstraction.
11. The abstraction of non-imperial art is not concerned with any particular public or audience. Non-imperial art is related to a kind of aristocratic-proletarian ethic : Alone, it does what it says, without distinguishing between kinds of people.
12. Non-imperial art must be as rigorous as a mathematical demonstration, as surprising as an ambush in the night, and as elevated as a star.
13. Today art can only be made from the starting point of that which, as far as Empire is concerned, doesn’t exist. Through its abstraction, art renders this inexistence visible. This is what governs the formal principle of every art : the effort to render visible to everyone that which for Empire (and so by extension for everyone, though from a different point of view), doesn’t exist.
14. Since it is sure of its ability to control the entire domain of the visible and the audible via the laws governing commercial circulation and democratic communication, Empire no longer censures anything. All art, and all thought, is ruined when we accept this permission to consume, to communicate and to enjoy. We should become the pitiless censors of ourselves.
15. It is better to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire already recognizes as existent.
Alain Badiou,Fifteen Theses on Contemporary Art
The “transcendental” aspect of the One appears in the threefold delineation of the “terms” which Laruelle takes it to “contain.” He describes these terms as “ a real or indivisible identity—the One-Real;  a term = X properly called, received from transcendence and which therefore is not immanent;  finally a term called ‘transcendental Identity,’ a veritable clone of the One which the term = X extracts from the Real.” Laruelle quickly reminds the reader that “in reality” (the way it is in-itself) the One is not reducible to any of these “terms.”† However, an elucidation of these terms is appropriate to our discussion.Ross Wolf, “Thoughts on François Laruelle’s Preface and Introduction to Principles of Non-Philosophy (as translated by Fractal Ontology’s Taylor Adkins)” Aoû 31, 2014
The first term bears the most similarity with mystical notions of the One, akin perhaps to the apeiron of Greek cosmology (the primal, formless chaos of Anaxagoras, Anaximander, etc.). It illustrates its primordial, undifferentiated identity.
The second term obviously alludes to the crucial passage in Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction” in the first (1781, A) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, wherein he explains the proposition “A = B” (that is to say, the relation of subject to object, the “dyad” of which Laruelle speaks) rests on the transcendental possibility of their relation = X. As Laruelle writes, this term is “received from transcendence” because it transcendentally (noumenally) grounds the relation of a subject and a predicate which appear (phenomenally) unlike. Kant describes this as a necessary postulate of reason, a negative limit which can be invoked but not positively described. Laruelle later (implicitly) chides the reflective wonder which Kant tacitly adopted from Leibniz in viewing the amenability of the objective world to subjective cognition of it as justifying “the postulation of a ‘miracle,’ common sense or pre-established harmony, which dedicates philosophy to begging the question.”
The final term, as Laruelle tells us, is abstracted/extracted (“over” and “out”) from this relation (X). In this respect the One is a clone (thereby ectypal) rather than original (archetypal) because it is conditioned by our empirical recognition of the relation by which we identify it. The dyad of A = B vows “revenge” on its duality, on its mutual alienation from its other, and “resigns its desire by extracting an image from the One (of) the One where the latter is not alienated.” I suspect this refers to the Hegelian henology, and accounts for the reciprocality of its 2/3 and 3/2 “fractional matrix.” The “3” side invariably refers to the transcendentally exterior “synthesis,” while the “2” refers to the immanently interior dualism of “thesis” and “antithesis” (to use crude Fichtean terms).
It is my belief that Laruelle intends to identify non-philosophy primarily with the first of these terms, the “One-Real.” Only this term is truly original and “radically immanent.” The second term, by contrast, is based on an observation of a relation in Being and is thus ontological; the third term simply takes this ontic relation and purifies it logically. Laruelle suggests that Marxism came close to making the “discovery/invention” (a beautiful paradox) of the One-in-One or One-Real, by inverting Hegel’s idealism into materialism/realism. Still, it had fallen prey to the old Hegelian practice of scolding the “common consciousness” (only now it was “false consciousness”) as an “ideological” byproduct over which it exalted itself as a material science. Again it fell back on assigning to ordinary cognition a regrettable status as non-philosophical, or “unscientific” (to use a Leninist epithet).
Laruelle’s project can best be summed up as a thought-experiment in the fullest meaning of this phrase—the experience of thought and the thought (of) experience—the experiment being concerned with what philosophy would become were it not representational at all, but rather the thing itself. By this I don’t mean to take philosophy as an aspect of Mind that is the Real (even if its most ‘complete’ aspect), for that would just be one more idealism, one more philosophical positing. Rather, the question is: what would we find if all philosophies, in their plurality, were real (and so not in accordance with their mutual exclusivity, their exclusive claims on truth and reality)? In this sense, Laruelle provides us with an application of Badiou’s subtractivism to philosophy per se, that is, in place of being as such equally sheer quantity or set-membership (Badiou), what philosophy is as such becomes sheer decisionism, that is, the pure attempt to evaluate the Real. This collective form or structure is both that which all philosophies have in common and that which makes them real. There is consequently no fallacy in going from the fact to value because values (transcendental evaluations) are types of facts once the’e been reduced en masse to all there is (the totality of philosophies each trying to establish its ‘truth’ as the one that ought to be true. As the most rigorous thought of immanence possible, non-philosophy allows every philosophy its truth and reality, not in the name of an epistemological relitavism (more Continental philosophy), but through a hypothetical Real-ism (a kind of Post-Continental naturalism).John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy, p. 149. Aoû 31, 2014
[N]on-philosophy works by taking a philosophical dyad as its material, not by thematising it (for this would only be a meta-duality or representation of the Real). It is notable that the more thoroughgoing pluralism of Laruelle is founded on a spatial signification (laterality), while that of Deleuze, which is still home to a distinction between common doxa (or Ur-doxa) and true philosophy, is founded on language and the voice (univocity).John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy: an outline, p. 146 Aoû 31, 2014
A unilateral duality is a non-relational ‘relation’ between the Real and philosophy. This sounds paradoxical, of course: if one asks the question, ‘what is the relation between relation and non-relation?’, one might at first simply refuse to answer (no less than we seemed to be at an impasse when we asked ‘what is the difference between differences in degree and differences in kind?’). Or one could venture the following response: ‘it is a unilateral duality’, by which Laruelle appears to mean another order of relation. This special relation renders philosophy level (lateral) with all other thought—save non-philosophy itself of course. It also uni-versalises (unilaterialises) thought relative (or according) to the Real. And finally, this non-relation just is non-philosophy, it is what it does.John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy: an outline, p. 147. Aoû 31, 2014